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We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the 
analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensi-
tively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profit-
able mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external effect of a proposed 
merger would represent a sufficient condition to allow the merger. However, 
the empirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of 
unprofitable mergers and economic theory, moreover, demonstrates that pri-
vately unprofitable mergers can be the result of rational action. Therefore, we 
extend the FSF by explicitly allowing for unprofitable mergers to occur with 
some frequency. This exerts a considerable impact on merger policy conclu-
sions: while several insights of the original FSF are corroborated (f.i. efficiency 
defence), a positive external effect does not represent a sufficient condition for 
the allowance of a merger anymore. Applying such a rule would cause a con-
siderable amount of false positives.  
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1.  Introduction 
The framework for analysing horizontal mergers introduced by Farrell and 
Shapiro (1990) has become very popular in industrial economics. In the context 
of the so-called ‘more-economic approach to competition policy’ (Neven 2006), 
this framework additionally enjoys an increasing importance for empirical and 
policy analyses of horizontal mergers. For instance, Duso et al. (2006, 2007) 
employ this framework in order to analyse the adequacy of merger decisions by 
the European Commission. One of the most distinctive characteristics of the 
Farrell-Shapiro-framework is the conceptual differentiation between an ‘inter-
nal effect’ (on the merging companies) and an ‘external effect’ (on the competi-
tors of the merging companies and on the consumers). This allows for a clari-
fied interpretation of an ‘efficiency defence’: the total welfare of a horizontal 
merger is positive if the positive internal effect overcompensates a negative ex-
ternal effect. Furthermore, any horizontal merger entailing a positive external 
effect is deemed to be welfare-enhancing (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 109, 117; 
1991: 1009). This policy conclusion is rooted in a crucial assumption: since ra-
tional enterprises will only engage in a merger if the combination increases the 
profitability of the merged entity compared to the non-merged companies, Far-
rell and Shapiro (1990: 109, 116; 1991: 1007) assume that only profitable 
mergers will occur,
1 i.e. the internal effect of rational mergers is always posi-
tive. In doing so, they find themselves in line with the majority of industrial 
economics analyses of horizontal mergers. 
 
Although the limitation to profitable mergers on the grounds of the rationality 
assumption appears to be straightforward, the empirical picture differs signifi-
cantly. According to the vast majority of empirical studies on merger profitabil-
ity, a considerable share of horizontal mergers fails to enhance profitability ex 
post (section 2). Moreover, it can be argued that unprofitable mergers might 
well be undertaken by rational agents (section 2). Therefore, we re-formulate 
                                                            
1   The increase in profits might either be a result of efficiencies (for instance, synergy effects or econo-
mies of scale) or a result of market power.  
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the Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) by introducing the possibility of unprofit-
able mergers to occur (section 3). Against this background, we review the pol-
icy conclusions given by Farrell and Shapiro (section 4). While we support 
some of their recommendations, we also find cases in which the disregard of 
unprofitable mergers impedes a welfare-maximising merger policy.  
2.  (Un-) Profitability of Mergers 
The comprehensive empirical literature on the profitability of mergers is typi-
cally classified into two methodological approaches: firstly, the ‘success’ of a 
merger is evaluated against the background of data from balance sheets pre- and 
post-merger, so-called outcome studies. These studies generally identify a sig-
nificant share of mergers that decrease profits as well as profitability post-
merger. Depending on the analysed timeframe and the included industries, the 
ratio of unprofitable mergers lies between 25 and 50 per cent (Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987; Kaplan and Weisbach 1992; Pautler 2001: 17-28; Tichy 2001: 
354-358; Gugler et al. 2003; Röller et al. 2006: 111-135). This share tends to 
increase with the transaction volume of the merger. Gugler et al. (2003) find 
that merely about 30 per cent succeeded in improving both profits and sales 
compared to a control group of non-merging companies. Furthermore, indica-
tion exists that internal growth performs systematically better than external 
growth through M&A-activity (Dickerson et al. 1997). Secondly, so-called 
event studies analyse stock market reactions to merger announcements. The un-
derlying idea is that capital markets reflect the profitability changes in the 
course of mergers and acquisitions through the evolution of (abnormal) stock 
returns. While studies that restrict themselves to a short window of time around 
the announcement generally find a large share of value-increasing mergers, 
those that employ a longer window of time - in particular extending to several 
years post-merger - show a wide distribution of results with a generally nega-
tive mean tendency (Rau and Vermaelen 1998; Andrade et al. 2001; Pautler 
2001: 10-16; Tichy 2001: 349-354; Röller et al. 2006: 111-135).  
7 
Each of these studies may be criticised on methodological grounds and their re-
sults are far from being homogeneous or mutually congruent. However, irre-
spective of the diversity of methods and irrespective of the respectively derived 
share of unprofitable mergers, the empirical picture clearly shows that unprofit-
able mergers do occur and do not represent a rare or negligible exception. This 
alone possesses some importance regarding the real-world applicability of pol-
icy conclusions from models only dealing with profitable mergers. Does it, 
however, really contradict the model assumptions? In the Farrell-Shapiro-
framework, it is assumed that rational enterprises engage only in profitable 
mergers. In principle, this offers scope for irrational (unprofitable) mergers. 
However, it seems a priori dissatisfying to label all unprofitable mergers ‘irra-
tional’. Therefore, the question arises whether rational agents might engage in 
unprofitable mergers. So, why do unprofitable mergers occur?  
 
First, certain mergers might well entail efficiency potentials but fail to realise 
these potentials post-merger. Post-merger management is not a trivial task and 
contains numerous imperfections. Second, available information will generally 
be imperfect (and maybe distorted) at the time of the merger decision, i.e. the ex 
ante assessment of the profitability of a merger project may prove to be wrong 
ex post. In both cases, enterprises engage boundedly rational in eventually un-
profitable mergers because at the time of decision they expect to form a profit-
able combination.  
 
Third, principal-agent problems between owners and managers can promote 
unprofitable mergers (Firth 1980; Jensen 1986). Rational managers will maxi-
mise their individual utility. Elements of the respective utility functions might 
include income, power, prestige, publicity or career opportunities - factors that 
depend more upon the size and growth of the company than on profitability 
(Jensen 1986; Tichy 2001). The literature refers to concepts like empire build-
ing (Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Trautwein 1990), hubris (Roll 1986), or free cash 
(Jensen 1986; Bruner 1988). Fourth, consultants may also be self-interested 
and, therefore, promote unprofitable mergers because creating a merger can be  
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more profitable for consultants than preventing a merger. Moreover, post-
merger re-organisation represents a lucrative follow-up business. Obviously, ra-
tional consultants will not promote unprofitable mergers if they can be made re-
sponsible for this ex post (negative reputation effects). However, in combina-
tion with imperfect information ex ante and difficulties with the identification 
of failure reasons ex post,
2 rational consultants might expect to escape without 
reputation damage, in particular if the assessment is a close call (i.e. a merger 
project is on the brink of profitability). An unambiguously unprofitable merger, 
however, can hardly be explained along these lines. In these two cases, result-
ing mergers might not be rational from an enterprise point of view, but they are, 
nevertheless, the result of individually rational agents acting within organisa-
tions (with normal control problems). 
 
Fifth, preemptive and defensive mergers might occur (Fridolfsson and Stennek 
2005). Company A might decide to merge with company B despite a lack of 
profitability of this combination in order to prevent B from merging with C 
(building of a powerful competitor) - an alternative that would be even worse 
for company A. Similarly, a merger might be done in order to prevent a hostile 
takeover of any merging party by C (white knight mergers). Although unprofit-
able in absolute terms, preemptive and defensive mergers might represent the 
less unprofitable choice for a specific enterprise and thus be rationally under-
taken. 
 
Sixth, mergers and especially merger waves are explained by psychological as-
pects, like herd behaviour (merging because everyone else merges), information 
cascades, framing effects, etc. It is debatable whether such phenomena belong 
to rational behaviour or not. While advanced concepts of rationality - referring 
to human cognitive and mental processes and their limits - would include them, 
                                                            
2   Why, for instance, did the Daimler-Chrysler merger fail? Was it wrong from the beginning or due to 
bad policy post-merger or even external, unpredictable market circumstances (e.g. the unexpected de-
cline of the SUV-segment in the U.S.)?  
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these modes of behaviour might well fall outside more traditional concepts of 
rationality. 
 
In summary, empirical evidence shows that unprofitable mergers occur with 
considerable frequency and theoretical explanations point out that rational 
agents have incentives to engage in unprofitable mergers. Therefore, merger 
policy cannot rely on a positive internal effect, i.e. that any proposed merger in-
creases the profits of the merged entity compared to the single enterprises, ei-
ther through (procompetitive) efficiency gains or through (anticompetitive) ex-
ploitation of market power. Employing the Farrell-Shapiro-framework for 
merger policy decisions, thus, requires consideration of the frequent occurrence 
of unprofitable mergers with a negative internal effect. In order to demonstrate 
the implications of this, we now address the Farrell-Shapiro framework in more 
detail. 
3.  Unprofitable Mergers in the Farrell-Shapiro-
Framework 
3.1.  The Farrell-Shapiro-Framework 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) use a model of Cournot oligopoly with homogenous 
goods. Inverse demand is given by  pX ( ), where X is total industry output, p is 
price and  ′  p X () < 0. The number of firms is exogenous and given by n, which 
rules out the entry of new firms.
3 
 
Firm i’s output and cost functions are given by  xi and c
i xi ( ), respectively, and 
cx
i xi ()  denotes firm i’s marginal cost. Total industry output is, therefore, given 
                                                            
3   Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 110) consider only the entry of new firms that behave oligopolistically. 
The entry by and existence of price-taking fringe firms is, however, not ruled out by the model 
framework. In this case  pX ()  can be interpreted as the residual demand curve facing the oligopolists.  
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by  X = xi i=1
n ∑  and  yi = x j j≠i ∑ = X − xi summarizes aggregated output of all firms 
other than firm i. 
 
In the Cournot equilibrium, every firm i maximizes its profits, 
π
i xi,yi () = px i + yi () xi −c
i xi () , over its output  xi, given its rivals’ output  yi. The solu-






= pX () + xi ′  p X () −cx
i xi () = 0, i =1,...,n, (1) 
 
holds for all n firms, whereas the existence and stability of a Cournot equilib-
rium requires the fulfilment of two weak assumptions on a given range: 
 
(a) Each firm’s reaction curve – which is given by (1) – slopes downward. This 
is equivalent with the requirement that firm i’s marginal revenue is lowered by 
an increase in rivals’ output, i.e. 
 
  ′  p xi + yi () + xi ′  ′  p xi + yi () < 0.
4 (2) 
 




i xi () > ′  p X () . (3) 
 
The slope of firm i’s reaction schedule can be derived from equation (1): 
dxi
dyi
= Ri, where −1< Ri < 0 because of (2) and (3). This means that firm i reduces 
its output if the other firms jointly expand their production. Yet, firm i contracts 
its output by less. Converting the slope of the reaction curve gives: 
 
                                                            
4   See also Novshek (1985: 90)  
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  dxi =−λi dX, (4) 
 
where  λi =−
Ri
1+ Ri
> 0 under the conditions given by (2) and (3), which measures 
firm i’s “output response to changes in industry output“ (Werden 1991: 1002). 
 
This results in the effect of an exogenous output change of firm 1 on the total 
industry output, which is given by the “Lemma“ (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 
111): Consider an exogenous change in firm 1’s output, and let the other firms’ 
output adjust to re-establish a Cournot equilibrium among themselves. If firms’ 
reaction curves slope downward (condition [2]), and if the stability condition 
[3] holds, then aggregate output moves in the same direction as firm 1’s output, 





Subsequently, the effect of a horizontal merger on the total output is analysed. 
Therefore, the cost function of the merged entity M,  c
M ⋅ () must be compared 
with the cost functions of the merging firms (“insiders“). The central result is 
given in proposition 1, whereby “M must enjoy substantially lower marginal 
costs than did its constituent firms, if price is to fall“ and industry output in-
creases respectively (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 112). This cost reduction must 
be larger, the larger the pre-merger market shares of the constituent firms were. 
It is, therefore, not unreasonable to expect a reduction in total output as a result 
of a merger. 
 
The following consideration of the total welfare effects contains the crucial as-
sumption that proposed mergers are privately profitable, i.e. the change in the 
insiders’ (I) total profits is positive (Δπ
I > 0). Under this central assumption a 
merger will raise welfare if it has a positive external effect on consumers and 
the nonparticipant firms („outsiders“) jointly (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 109). 
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In order to determine the sign of the external effect, the reaction of the outsiders 
O with respect to an output change of the insiders must be considered. With 
this, the total effect on outsiders’ profits π
O and consumer surplus CS can be de-
termined. The change in equilibrium output by the insiders, ΔXI, can be treated 
as exogenous because “consumers care only about the net effect on aggregate 
output,  ΔX, and [...] rivals care only about the change in equilibrium output by 
the merging (‘insider’) firms, ΔXI, not about what caused that change“ (Farrell 
and Shapiro 1990: 114). The total change in insiders’ output ΔXI is considered 
as the integral of infinitesimal changes dXI. First, the external effect is deter-
mined due to an infinitesimal merger and the total external effect is the integral 















1  2  4  4  3  4  4 
× ′  p X () dX. (5) 
 
Given the reasons that determine the change in insiders’ output it is particularly 
important to consider the case of an output reduction. Converting η into market 
shares, i.e. si =
xi
X
, the external effect is positive if the sum of the outsiders’ mar-
ket shares – weighted by their reaction parameters – is larger than the insiders’ 
market shares, i.e.  λi si > sI i∈O ∑  (see proposition 4 of Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 
115). 
 
In order to determine the total external effect it must be shown that this condi-
tion is fulfilled along a “path” given by ΔXI. Hence “the net externality is a 
weighted integral of η along a path from  XI
initial to  XI




  ΔW −Δπ










In proposition 5 (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 116), sufficient conditions are 
given for an increase of η as  XI falls. If these conditions are fulfilled, it follows 
for η ≥ 0 before a merger that an output reducing and profitable merger results in 
an increase in total welfare. Therefore, any proposed merger that is aligned with 
a positive external effect should be allowed. If the external effect of a merger is 
negative, the reverse does not apply automatically and the positive change in 
insiders’ profits can offset the negative external effect. These conclusions are 
based on the presumption that mergers are only proposed if they are privately 
profitable, i.e. Δπ
I >0. The case of unprofitable mergers is explicitly ruled out of 
the analysis (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 109, 115-116). 
3.2.  Extensions and Modifications 
This section gives a brief literature-based overview of models that modify and 
enhance the Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF). In regards to the aim of this pa-
per, we particularly focus on whether the profitability assumption becomes 
modified. Barros and Cabral (1994) apply the FSF to mergers in open econo-
mies. They uphold the assumption that only profitable mergers are proposed 
and introduce merger control authorities. If consumers and producers are lo-
cated in different countries, different objective functions of an international 
merger authority and national authorities and the resulting welfare implications 
are analysed. Levin (1990) analyses the effects of mergers of a fraction of firms 
in markets where the outsiders are restricted to behaving à la Cournot, whereas 
the insiders (i.e. merging firms) are not. The results supplement the ones of 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Concerning welfare analysis, the focus lies on prof-
itable mergers. Any proposed merger of a fraction of firms with no more than 
50 percent of the premerger market share causes welfare to rise. Also in a 
                                                            
5   The lower and upper bound of the integral are given by  X I
final
 and  X I
initial
 respectively because the in-
sider output falls from  X I
initial




Cournot setting, Hennessy (2000) regards mergers of a small fraction of firms. 
He contrasts the view that these mergers are motivated by cost efficiencies in-
stead of enhancing market power. In doing so, he refers to special industry de-
mand curves that allow the occurrence of welfare-reducing mergers because of 
their private profitability even without cost efficiencies. 
 
Verboven (1994) compares the results of the static Cournot model of Farrell 
and Shapiro (1990) with a model of quantity-setting firms that behave collu-
sive. Assuming a linear demand function, the insiders’ maximum allowable 
market share in the case of an output-decreasing capital transfer is higher than 
with Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Yet, this comparison also considers only pri-
vately profitable mergers. Spector (2003) analyses a Cournot market in which 
the assumptions of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) hold, except for the fact that en-
try is allowed. In this setting also only profitable mergers are analysed and wel-
fare is regarded according to a consumer welfare standard. If mergers fail to 
generate synergies or economies of scale (not induced by fixed costs), then con-
sumers are harmed, i.e. prices are higher, irrespective of entry conditions. 
Brueckner and Spiller (1991) consider airline networks (hub-and-spoke net-
works), which are characterised by economies of density and costs of comple-
mentarities. Competition on parts of these networks generates negative exter-
nalities on markets outside the competitive parts. As a result, mergers on the 
competitive parts can have net positive gains in consumer surplus, which leads 
them to the reconsideration of antitrust policy in not focussing attention on the 
parts where market power may increase. They do not, however, explicitly con-
sider unprofitable mergers in evaluating the overall welfare effect. 
 
Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) regard sequential merger decisions of disjoint 
groups of firms and their intertemporal dependence. Most important with re-
spect to our analysis is the strategic motive, which reflects the effect of one 
merger on possible future merger decisions by rival firms, and its implications 
for policy conclusions. Concerning unprofitable mergers the strategic motive 
explains these in expectation of future mergers, which will have a positive  
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feedback for the first. While the policy conclusions are derived by explicitly re-
ferring to and reconsidering the argumentation of the Farrell-Shapiro-
framework, the analysis of Nilssen and Sørgard (1998) is distinct to ours in that 
they refer to the possible intertemporal dependences of merger decisions and 
the effects on the evaluation of welfare effects. Our analysis focuses on the ef-
fects of introducing unprofitable mergers and the implications on assessment 
decisions for these based on the Farrell-Shapiro-framework. 
 
Fridolfsson (2007) analyses endogenous merger formation. In this setup firms 
have strong incentives to engage in anti- rather than pro-competitive mergers. 
One reason is that firms pre-empt being an outsider of procompetitive mergers, 
which would have a negative external effect on them. The lack of pursuing pro-
competitive mergers, which would result in an output-increase, is the benefit 
(i.e. external effect) that outsiders gain from anticompetitive mergers. As a pol-
icy conclusion, Fridolfsson (2007) regards the assessment of the relevant alter-
natives to a proposed merger, which may be another merger rather than the 
original market structure. However, this approach focuses on an endogenous 
explanation of the formation of unprofitable mergers, whereas we analyse the 
effects of unprofitable mergers (however motivated) in the FSF. 
 
Cheung (1992) addresses the problem of an automatic inference from the 
proposition of mergers on the creation of a minimal level of required cost sav-
ings because of the profitability assumption. Since output-increasing mergers 
can reduce welfare, Cheung (1992: 119-120) shows – by the means of a simple 
numerical example – that these mergers have an incentive to underestimate cost 
savings in order to imitate output-reducing mergers. The application of Farrell 
and Shapiro’s externality condition does not handle this problem because pro-
posed mergers are assumed to be privately profitable and the fulfilment of the 
externality condition indicates a welfare-improving merger. As a result, some 
welfare-reducing mergers are allowed. He provides his policy conclusions by 
either obtaining more precise information or by banning all output-reducing  
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mergers. Cheung’s numerical example fits as a special case of our more general 
treatment of the problem. 
 
Two specifically interesting papers address an often neglected subcase of the 
FSF. When mergers are privately not profitable (wherefore they are not done) 
but desirable from a total welfare perspective, then according to Faulí-Oller 
(2002) and Dragone et al. (2006) subsidising the unwilling-to-merge firms be-
comes the welfare-optimal merger policy in a couple of very specific cases.
6 
We will address this issue more closely in our more general framework in sec-
tion 4. 
3.3.  Introducing Unprofitable Mergers 
We now consider the case of an output-reducing merger, i.e. ΔXI < 0. It emerges 
from proposition 1 that this case is very reasonable because an increase in out-
put requires substantially lower marginal costs of the merged entity compared 
to its constituent firms. As Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 111) note, “[m]ergers 
differ enormously in the extent to which productive assets can usefully be re-
combined”. The authors permit possible relationships between the merged en-
tity’s cost function and the cost functions of its constituent firms, but they ex-
plicitly refer to changes that follow anticompetitive motivations, rationalization 
or synergies. Wherewith, it is implicitly assumed that the change in the costs is 
positive.
7 Since no a priori assumptions on the merged entity’s cost function are 
made – except the ones given by conditions (2) und (3) – negative movements 
of costs due to a merger are not ruled out. 
 
If the assumption of privately profitable mergers is removed, two important 
conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, it is permitted that a change in costs due to a 
                                                            
6   Both Faulí-Oller (2002) and Dragone et al. (2006) restrict their analyses to very specific cases – de-
clining industries and industries with plenty competitors plus insignificant fixed costs, respectively. 
7   Because the authors primarily consider output-reducing mergers, it is implicitly assumed that this 
positive change in costs is not big enough.  
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merger was misjudged, is unexpected or was intentional (see managerial inter-
ests). Secondly, this need not mean that mergers lead to losses; merely the 
change in insiders’ profits – after the merger combined in the merged entity – is 
now permitted to be negative. 
 
Otherwise, the framework of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) is maintained and now 
used to permit the possibility of unprofitable mergers, i.e. Δπ
I <0. Given the 
reasons that determine the change in insiders’ output, we focus on output reduc-
ing mergers, i.e. ΔXI < 0. This is most plausible if it is assumed that a negative 
change in insiders’ profits is the result of disadvantageous cost changes. 
 
Again the case of an infinitesimal merger is considered first. The external effect 
is given by (5). After converting η into market shares, i.e.  λi si − sI i∈O ∑ , the rea-
soning is thus analogous to the one given in proposition 4. A small reduction in 
insiders’ output has a net negative welfare effect on outsiders and consumers if 
and only if the sum of the outsiders’ market shares – weighted by their reaction 
parameters – is smaller than the insiders’ market shares, i.e. sI > λi si i∈O ∑ . 
 
In order to discuss the total external effect the integral of infinitesimal changes 
must be considered. As noted above and given by (6) “the net externality is a 
weighted integral of η along a path from  XI
initial to  XI
final” (Farrell and Shapiro 
1990: 116). Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 116) mention a sufficient condition in 
the footnote for the total effect on outsiders and consumers to be negative. This 
condition is fulfilled if η <0 after the merger. It is sufficient for an output-
reducing merger because η increases as  XI falls.
8 In this case, total welfare de-
creases as a result of an unprofitable merger. For η to be negative after the 
merger, it has to be sufficiently negative before the merger, i.e.  λi xi << XI i∈O ∑ . 
The other possibility is that η changes its sign in the course of the “infinitesimal 
                                                            
8   See proposition 5 in Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 116). The authors give sufficient conditions for an in-
crease of η as XI falls.  
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mergers”, but the total external effect is negative. Both reflect the point that 
“big mergers” should be addressed with caution. 
 
Converting η into market shares, this means that the insiders’ market shares be-
fore the merger must be sufficiently large. In Fig. 1, this case is positioned in 
the southwestern quadrant δ. 
 
     
   Δπ
I  
                        
  β  
γ  α 
              45°    
          ΔW −Δπ
I  
 
            δ             ζ  
   ε 
         
    
 
If the total external effect of an unprofitable merger is positive, two possibilities 
have to be considered: 
 
A.  the negative change in insiders’ profits outweighs the positive external 
effect, which causes total welfare to fall (area ε), or 
B.  the positive external effect is larger than the negative change in insiders’ 
profits, which causes total welfare to rise (area ζ ). 
 
In case A, the positive external effect must not be too large because the prob-
ability is increased that the profit change of the insiders will be outweighed. A 
sufficient condition for the external effect to be positive is given by η ≥0 before 
the merger. Firstly, the described situation is fulfilled the closer η lies to zero 
before the merger. Secondly, η changes its sign in the course of the “infinitesi-
Figure 1.  Welfare Effects of Horizontal Mergers (modified version from 
Farrell and Shapiro’s (1990: 117) original)  
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mal mergers” and the total effect is larger than zero. In both cases, the result is a 
fall in total welfare because the negative change in insiders’ output amounts to 
more than the positive external effect. Both mentioned cases again address cau-
tion towards the permission of “bigger mergers”. 
 
In case B, the positive external effect outweighs the change in insiders’ profits. 
Despite the unprofitability of the merger, total welfare rises. Therefore, the total 
external effect must be sufficiently large. Due to the relation between η and  XI, 
this means that η has to be sufficiently large. The situation is most easily ful-
filled if η is positive, both before and after the merger, i.e. the difference be-
tween the weighted market shares of the outsiders and the insiders’ market 
shares is positive before the merger and rises after it.
9 This describes situations 
that are supported by sufficiently low market shares of the insiders,
10 and 
somewhat supports a cautious approach towards so-called “safe harbour” provi-
sions. 
4.  Consequences for Merger Policy 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) draw their policy conclusions under the restrictive 
assumptions that only privately profitable mergers are proposed to the competi-
tion authorities. This implies that they (almost) exclusively look at the upper 
half of figure one. In doing so, their recommendation for merger policy reads: 
“Privately unprofitable mergers will not be proposed, so proposed mergers 
should be permitted unless their external effects are ‘sufficiently’ bad to out-
weigh their private profitability” (Farrell and Shapiro 1990: 116-117). The au-
                                                            
9   Given that η is positive both before and after the merger this situation describes one possibility for the 
total external effect being large enough. Another possibility is that η changes sign and the functional 
relation η X ()  is strong enough that the total effect can outweigh the negative change in insiders’ prof-
its. 
10   The reaction parameters λ of the outsiders have to be considered as well. However, this complicates 
the analysis without altering the basic thought.  
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thors suggest a two-part procedure for merger review by competition authorities 
(ibid: 117-118). First, determine the external effect (
I W π Δ − Δ ). If it is positive, 
allow the merger (area α ). If it is negative, then, second, estimate the profit ef-
fect (
I π Δ ). If 
I I W π π Δ − Δ > Δ , then allow the merger (efficiency defence; area 
β ), otherwise the merger should be prohibited (area γ ). 
 
Against the background of the empirics of mergers, however, the overall picture 
(according to section 3.3) must be interpreted in order to derive sound recom-
mendations for competition authorities. Our interpretation of all six areas from 
the FSF (fig. 1), including the areas with unprofitable mergers (negative inter-
nal effect), reveals some concordance with Farrell and Shapiro, but also some 
extensions and divergences. 
 
Area (α ):  0 0 > Δ − Δ ∧ > Δ
I I W π π , both the internal and the external effect are 
positive. In compliance with Farrell and Shapiro, unconditional permission is 
recommended from a total-welfare perspective.
11  
 
Area (β ):  Δπ
I > 0 and  0 < Δ − Δ
I W π  with 
I I W π π Δ − Δ > Δ , i.e. the positive inter-
nal effect outweighs the negative external effect. This is the area in which an ef-
ficiency defence is meaningful and becomes an important element of a welfare-
                                                            
11   Note that employing a different welfare standard might alter the assessment. For instance, within EU 
competition policy, a consumer welfare standard is applied. While the total welfare standard seeks the 
maximisation of the sum of producers and consumers rent, the consumer welfare standard seeks to 
maximise the consumers rent. The FSF does not allow for straightforward conclusions regarding such 
a consumer welfare standard because the external effect (
I W π Δ − Δ ) consists of elements of produc-
ers rents (the outsider firms to the merger) and the consumers surplus:  CS W
O I + Δ = Δ − Δ π π . 
Therefore, despite an overall positive external effect, consumers might be hurt but their welfare loss is 
overcompensated by the increasing profits of the remaining competitors of the merging companies. 
The larger the external effect is, however, the less likely such a scenario becomes (if 
0 >> Δ − Δ
I W π , then  0 >>> Δ
O π  in order to allow for  0 < CS ). Vice versa, a negative external ef-
fect need not necessarily imply a reduction of consumer welfare since an increase in CS  might be 
overcompensated by a loss in 
O π Δ . Again, this becomes less likely with an increasingly negative ex-
ternal effect.  
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maximising merger policy. Despite anticompetitive effects (a reduction of the 
sum of consumers rents and competitors rents), total welfare is increased be-
cause the efficiency gains from the merger overcompensate them. Thus, per-
mission is recommended from a total welfare perspective.
12  
 
Area (γ ): Δπ
I >0 and  0 < Δ − Δ
I W π  with 
I I W π π Δ − Δ < Δ , i.e. the negative exter-
nal effect outweighs the positive internal effect. Mergers within this area are 
anticompetitive. Thus, prohibition is recommended from a total welfare per-
spective.  
 
Area (δ ):  0 0 < Δ − Δ ∧ < Δ
I I W π π , both the internal and the external effect are 
negative. This area consists of anticompetitive mergers: thus, prohibition is 
recommended from a total welfare perspective. This area is neglected by the 
original FSF. Therefore, a merger policy abstaining from the frequent occur-
rence of unprofitable mergers might err here. The FSF implies an asymmetric 
treatment: while a positive external effect suffices to allow a merger, a negative 
external effect is not sufficient to prohibit a merger, simply because the internal 
effect is assumed to be positive and, therefore, a trade-off arises inevitably. 
Consequently, δ -mergers would not be blocked automatically in the course of 
the two-part procedure suggested by Farrell and Shapiro (see above). Instead, 
their destiny would depend on the estimation of the internal effect that is – as 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 117-118) admit – subject to some error risk. False 
positives (allowing a welfare-reducing merger) might, nevertheless, be rare 
since the competition authority should not find substantial efficiencies in such 
cases (that potentially outweigh the negative external effect) and, thus, should – 
in practice – prohibit these cases anyway. A residual might arise in cases where 
the negative external effect is very small, and the authority is thus willing to ac-
                                                            
12   Even under a consumer welfare standard, some β -mergers might be approvable, namely cases where 
the negative external effect results from a small increase in consumer welfare that is outweighed by a 
larger decrease in competitors welfare. Therefore, prohibiting all β -mergers would be against wel-
fare maximisation even under a consumer welfare standard and, in some cases, protect competitors 
instead of consumers.  
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cept rather vague efficiencies because in a world without unprofitable mergers 
almost every merger would be able to offset a small negative external effect. 
Then, false positives could occur to a certain extent if awareness for the fre-
quent occurrence of privately unprofitable mergers is lacking.  
 
Area (ε ):  0 < Δ
I π  and  0 > Δ − Δ
I W π  with 
I I W π π Δ − Δ > Δ , i.e. the negative inter-
nal effect outweighs the positive external effect. In this case, a merger policy 
following the original FSF analysis commits errors, more specifically false 
positives. Due to the positive external effect, the merger is allowed although to-
tal welfare is reduced. In the modified interpretation, where unprofitable merg-
ers are considered, ε -mergers are anticompetitive and should be prohibited un-
der a total welfare standard. This leads to the important implication that the 
general recommendation of the original FSF – every merger with a positive ex-
ternal effect should be permitted – cannot be sustained in the modified FSF (in-
clusion of privately unprofitable mergers). 
 
Result I: If unprofitable mergers are allowed to be proposed, a positive external 
effect does not represent a sufficient condition for the allowance of a merger 
anymore! 
 
Area (ζ ): 0 < Δ
I π  and  0 > Δ − Δ
I W π  with 
I I W π π Δ − Δ < Δ , i.e. the positive exter-
nal effect outweighs the negative internal effect. Although the original FSF 
does not expect ζ -mergers to occur, a respectively styled merger policy would 
not make mistakes in such cases. Due to the positive external effect, ζ -mergers 
would be allowed and this unwittingly corresponds to the resulting increase in 
total welfare. In a way, the right result is achieved for the wrong reasons.  
 
However, if total welfare should be maximised consequently according to this 
framework, then the allowance of actually proposed ζ -mergers would not suf-
fice. Instead, it would imply enforcing ζ -mergers even against the wishes of  
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the firms because it increases total welfare and is Kaldor-Hicks-superior.
13 As 
well as allowing an anticompetitive merger for efficiency reasons (area β ) by 
assessing and judging the private profitability of a merger project, a competition 
authority in the FSF maximises welfare if it evaluates and judges the external 
effect of possible mergers (that are not proposed voluntarily by the companies) 
and instructs them to merge in case it finds them located in area ζ .
14 Alterna-
tively, the competition authority could apply subsidies as an instrument to pro-
mote ζ -mergers (Faulí-Oller 2002; Dragone et al. 2006). The latter instrument 
might be viewed to be less controversial in regard to existing laws (private 
property rights). However, from a strict welfare point of view it is also less op-
timal because of the resulting burden on taxpayers. 
 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 117) explicitly reject compulsion or subsidies to 
implement  ζ -mergers because “both of which would be enormous changes 
from our antitrust policy”. We find this reasoning, however, not very convinc-
ing. In their article, Farrell and Shapiro draw policy conclusions and recom-
mend certain merger policies which implies that they intend to change hitherto 
antitrust policy in the first place. This stands in accordance with the widely held 
view that competition economics-research is beneficial for designing and re-
forming practical competition policy. Moreover, a theory concerning why grad-
ual changes shall be recommended but ‘enormous’ changes not (wherever the 
delineation lies) is not provided. Furthermore, it lies at the heart of the FSF that 
a competition authority should maximise welfare by evaluating, assessing and 
eventually judging concrete merger projects. It cannot be derived from the 
framework why the welfare maximisation activities of the competition authority 
should be restricted to voluntarily proposed merger projects. This line of argu-
                                                            
13   In accordance with Farrell and Shapiro (1990: 117, ft. 19), Pareto-optimality is not employed in this 
framework. 
14   The same holds for privately profitable mergers that are not proposed due to the imperfections of the 
merger process and self-interested managers and advisers but that would increase total welfare (α - 
and β -mergers).  
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ment becomes strengthened if firms are assumed to also engage in unprofitable 
mergers. 
 
Despite rejecting Farrell and Shapiro’s reasoning against enforcing welfare-
enhancing mergers against the wishes of the companies, we share their concerns 
about a merger policy that instructs or subsidizes mergers. However, we find 
their reasons insufficient since the FSF does not include any element that rules 
out such a policy. Actually, the FSF on its own is compatible with a merger pol-
icy where the competition authority organizes and determines the market struc-
ture (instead of the competitive process) against the background of comprehen-
sive evaluations of possible mergers and their welfare effects (orchestrative 
merger policy) – admittedly taken to the extreme. However, there is some like-
lihood that interested parties could apply the framework in such a manner.
15  
 
However, before implementing FSF into merger control, additional assumptions 
have to be relaxed and controlled for the subsequent effects. This includes am-
bitious assumptions about the knowledge of the competition authority and the 
measurability of the actual internal and external effects. Additionally, it touches 
basic questions of the primacy of individual disposition about property rights 
(freedom of competition).  
 
Result II: An isolated application of the modified FSF implies far-reaching wel-
fare-improving intervention opportunities for merger control authorities. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this article, we demonstrate that the popular FSF relies in its policy conclu-
sions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose pri-
                                                            
15   Faulí-Oller (2002) and Dragone et al. (2006) represent considerable steps into this direction. Addi-
tionally, in a public choice view, the development towards a comprehensive ‘merger control and in-
struction agency’ would enhance the powers and resources of a competition authority as a bureauc-
racy which could fuel the self-interested adoption of comparable reasoning.  
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vately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external effect of a 
proposed merger would represent a sufficient condition to allow the merger. 
However, the empirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a signifi-
cant share of unprofitable mergers and economic theory, moreover, demon-
strates that privately unprofitable mergers can be the result of rational action. 
Therefore, we extend the FSF by explicitly allowing unprofitable mergers to 
occur with some frequency. This exerts a considerable impact on merger policy 
conclusions: while several insights of the original FSF are corroborated (f.i. ef-
ficiency defence), a positive external effect does not represent a sufficient con-
dition for the allowance of a merger anymore. Applying such a rule would 
cause a considerable amount of false positives. In addition, an isolated applica-
tion of the modified FSF implies far-reaching welfare-improving intervention 
opportunities for merger control authorities.  
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Appendix 
We regard a simple model which is able to describe all possible types of merg-
ers out of the graphical illustration in Figure 1 by referring to the analysis of 
Salant et al. (1983) in conjunction with Dragone et al. (2006). 
 
Salant et al. (1983) regard the impact of mergers by referring to Cournot’s clas-
sic example. Given the notation of section 3 of our paper, inverse demand is 
given by  () X X p − = β , with  0 > β , X denotes total industry output and p denotes 
the price. The number of firms is exogenous and given by n. Firm i’s output is 
given by  xi. It is assumed that the n firms are identical with the same marginal 
costs c and fixed costs F. Thus, total industry output is given by  X = xi i=1
n ∑  and 
i i j j x X x − = ∑ ≠  summarizes aggregated output of all firms other than firm i. 
 
Firm i now maximises its profit by setting  xi, i.e.  ( ) max
i
i x p Xc x F − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . Assuming 
that the n firms are identical, the output of each firm will be the same in a sym-
metric Nash equilibrium, i.e.  x x x j i = = ,
16 which is given by  () ( ) 1 xc n β =− + . 
Price and profit of each firm will, therefore, be given by  ()( ) ( ) 1 pX n c n β =+ +  
and  () ( )( )
2 1 x cn F πβ =− +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , respectively. 
 
Now,  1 m+  firms merge (“insiders”) and the number of independent firms de-
creases to nm −  (nm =  describes the limiting case of a monopolisation of a mar-
ket). Thereby, m can be interpreted as the size of the merger, i.e. the market 
share of the merging firms.
17 Differently to the assumption of Salant et al. 
(1983: 191 et sqq.), the merging firms do not totally shut down all of the plants 
but one. At this point, we rather refer to the analysis of Dragone et al. (2006). 
They assume that efficiency gains are “the outcome of an adjustment in fixed 
                                                            
16   See Salant et al. (1983: 191). 
17   See Salant et al. (1983: 193) and Dragone et al. (2006: 3).  
31 
costs via the merger” (Dragone et al. 2006: 2). The reduction in total fixed costs 
of the insiders following the merger amounts to a fraction smaller than mF be-
cause of a “restructuration of production plants within the resulting firm” 
(Dragone et al. 2006: 4); fixed costs of the resulting  firm amount to ( ) 1 eF + , 
with  () 0, 1 em ∈− . The parameter e thus describes the inefficiency of the merger, 
i.e. a higher value of e is equal to lower restructuration gains. Marginal costs 
are unchanged. 
 




i i X x
−
= =∑  and  p ˆ  X  () = β − ˆ  X , respec-
tively, whereas the roof denotes the post-merger situation. Each firm’s output in 
the new symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by  ( ) ( ) ˆ 1 xc n m β = −− + . The result-
ing price  () () ( ) ˆ 1 pX n mc n m β =+ − − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  is larger than  ( ) X p  for  c β > , which must 
be fulfilled to have a strictly positive industry output. Insiders’ profits and the 
profits of the  1 nm −−  outsiders (non-merging firms) amount to 
() ( )( ) ()
2 ˆ 11
I x cn m e F πβ =− − +− + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  and  () ( )( )
2
ˆ 1
O x cn m F πβ = −− + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , respec-
tively. 
 
According to Salant et al. (1983: 190-191) the profitability of a merger is given 
by the difference between the post-merger profit  ( ) ˆ
I x π  and the sum of the pre-
merger profits of the 2 insiders:
18 
 
(0.1)  ( ) () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) { } ()
22 2 ˆ 11 1 1
II x mx c n m m n m e F ππ π β
−−
Δ= −+ =− − + −+ + +− . 
 
Joint Profits of the outsiders and the consumer surplus (CS) change as follows: 
 
(0.2)  ( ) () ()












⎡⎤ −− + − − ⎣⎦ ⎡⎤ Δ=− − − = ⎣⎦ +− +
, and 
                                                            
18   The first derivative with respect to m is given by: 









= −− + − −+ +
∂ .  
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(0.3)  () ()
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This results in the determination of the external effect due to Farrell and 
Shapiro (1990), i.e. the sum of the consumer surplus and joint outsiders’ profits 
()
O CS π Δ+ Δ : 
 






















11 2 1 21
IO WC S
nm n nm n
cm e F
nm n nm n
ππ
β
Δ= Δ+ Δ + Δ
⎧⎫ −− ⎪⎪ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =− − − + +− ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ −+ + −+ + ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎪⎪ ⎩⎭
 
 
Thus, we can now describe the effect of a merger in settings which differ in the 
crucial parameters m, e and F. The first variation considers different sizes of 
mergers, the second variation considers the efficiency of restructuration due to 
mergers, and the third variation considers the possible amount of the second 
variation. Thereby, it is possible to describe all mergers out of the graphical il-
lustration in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Welfare Effects of Horizontal Mergers (modified version from 
Farrell and Shapiro’s (1990: 117) original) 
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Generally, an increase of the inefficiency parameter e reduces the profitability 
of the merger. Given the merger of two or few firms, the variation goes along 
the areas α, ζ, ε. Thus, the change in total welfare is more likely to be positive 
but small, and at some point it drops below the 45°-line into the negative part. 
However, the change of the external effect does not turn out to be negative due 
to a positive development of the outsiders’ profits. In contrast, if many firms 
merge, the change of the external effect does not turn out to be positive due to 
the highly negative impact on consumer surplus. Then, an increase of the ineffi-
ciency parameter ε also reduces the profitability of the merger, but the variation 
now goes along the areas β, γ, δ. Thus, an efficiency defence is more likely for 
high efficiencies; the change in total welfare quickly drops below the 45°-line 
into the negative part. 
 
The number of merging firms also has a clear impact, which can be shown in a 
counter clockwise move along the areas. The effects of a smaller number of 
firms can more often be illustrated with the areas ε, ζ, α, whereas the effects of a 
higher number of merging firms can more often be illustrated with the areas β, 
γ, δ. 
 
High fixed costs make the mergers more profitable, i.e. savings are possible in a 
higher amount. This result holds for few as well as for many merging parties.  
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Thereby, a higher inefficiency parameter e increases the amount of fixed costs 
needed to turn a merger into profitability. Given two or few merging parties, in-
creasing fixed costs leads to a variation along the areas ε, ζ, α. Thus, the change 
in total welfare turns from negative into positive and the change of the external 
effect does not turn out to be negative due to a positive development of the out-
siders’ profits. In contrast, if many firms merge, the change of the external ef-
fect does not turn out to be positive due to the highly negative impact on con-
sumer surplus. Then, an increase of the fixed costs F also increases the profit-
ability of the merger, but the variation now goes along the areas δ, γ, β. Fur-
thermore, small changes in the amount of fixed costs now also have very high 
impacts and the resulting effects of a merger quickly switch between the men-
tioned areas. 
 
Unprofitability of a merger is possible in this simple framework if many firms 
merge (i.e. a high market share of the merging firms) and/or if the inefficiency 
parameter is high (i.e. a merger unlikely leads to efficiencies). 
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